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Abstract Studying the interactions between preference and capacity manipulation
in matching markets, we prove that acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient condition
that guarantees the stability of a Nash equilibrium and the strategy-proofness of truth-
ful capacity revelation under the hospital-optimal and intern-optimal stable rules. We
then introduce generalized games of manipulation in which hospitals move first and
state their capacities, and interns are subsequently assigned to hospitals using a se-
quential mechanism. In this setting, we first consider stable revelation mechanisms
and introduce conditions guaranteeing the stability of the outcome. Next, we prove
that every stable non-revelation mechanism leads to unstable allocations, unless re-
strictions on the preferences of the agents are introduced.
Keywords Stable matching · Nash equilibrium · Capacity · Acyclicity
JEL Classification C71 · C78 · D71
1 Introduction
The literature has studied preference and capacity manipulation separately and has
thus overlooked the interaction between the two. However, many hiring and admis-
sion procedures allow firms, hospitals and schools to state the number of their vacant
positions before candidates are assigned. This creates a possibility of capacity ma-
nipulation before the matching process. Furthermore, ex-ante manipulation does not
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prevent agents from misrepresenting their preferences during the matching process.
In this paper, we present a many-to-one matching model that allows for both capacity
and preference manipulation. Our objective is to understand whether a mechanism
that includes a capacity reporting stage can implement stable allocations.
Indeed, there exists a widespread opinion that markets producing stable outcomes
are more successful than those that do not produce such outcomes (see Roth and
Sotomayor, 1990 and Roth, 2002). We begin our analysis by isolating the strategic
options at work in our settings. As a preliminary step, we concentrate solely on capac-
ity manipulation. We focus on the Nash equilibria (NE) of capacity reporting games.
First, we provide an equivalence result, that is, the NE of capacity reporting games are
stable if and only if the stable rule used is immune to capacity manipulation. Second,
we provide conditions under which capacity reporting games yield stable matchings
at the NE. For this reason, we introduce the concept that the agents’ preferences are
acyclical. A cycle in the preferences of hospitals (interns) occurs when there is an
alternating list of hospitals and interns “on a circle” such that every hospital (intern)
prefers the intern (hospital) on its clockwise side to the intern (hospital) on its coun-
terclockwise side and finds both acceptable. We say that preferences are acyclical if
there are no cycles. In addition, we say that a group of agents form a simultaneous
cycle if they form a cycle both in the preferences of interns and hospitals. Acyclicity
holds, in particular, when the preferences of the agents on one side of the market are
aligned. We prove that an absence of simultaneous cycles in the preferences of the
agents guarantees the stability of the NE of capacity reporting games when any stable
rule is used.
In addition, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the stability of the
NE when the hospital-optimal stable rule is employed. However, acyclicity is not
necessary for the stability of NE outcomes under the intern-optimal stable rule. Thus,
the intern-optimal stable rule is less prone to capacity manipulation than the hospital-
optimal stable rule. We prove that the capacity reporting game can produce unstable
NE if and only if the preferences of the hospitals satisfy a complex cycle condition.
First, the preferences of the hospitals must be non-monotonic in population. Then,
the cycles in the preferences of hospitals must be linked in a particular way. These
findings extend the results of Konishi and U¨nver (2006) and are related to the work
of Kesten (2010).
Third, we proceed to study what we call generalized games of manipulation
(GGM). GGM are two-stage extensive form games. In the first stage, each hospital
states its capacity. In the second stage, the agents play a general assignment game. We
do not specify a particular assignment game, but we consider two classes of mecha-
nisms: revelation stable and non-revelation stable mechanisms.
In stable revelation mechanisms, agents are asked to submit their preferences, and
stable matching is then implemented. This type of mechanism has been successfully
used in practice (see, for instance, Roth and Sotomayor, 1990 and Roth, 2002) but can
be manipulated thorough the misrepresentation of both preferences (see Dubins and
Freedman, 1981) and capacities (So¨nmez, 1997).1 Provided that the preferences of
1 The under-reporting of capacities was a source of major concern in the school choice program in NYC
before it was redesigned (see Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2005).
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the interns are acyclical, we prove that the iterated elimination of weakly dominated
strategies produces a stable matching if the intern-optimal stable rule is employed.
Additionally, when the preferences of the hospitals are known, any stable rule pro-
duces stable allocations if the preferences of the agents do not have simultaneous
cycles.
A stable non-revelation mechanism is any sequential game of complete informa-
tion such that the interaction of agents leads to stable allocations with respect to the
stated capacities (some examples of non-revelation stable mechanisms are presented
in Kara and So¨nmez, 1997; Alcalde and Romero-Medina, 2000; and Sotomayor,
2003). We show that there is no family of such games that implements stable match-
ings at every Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE). However, if only acyclical prefer-
ences are allowed, any non-revelation mechanism implements stable allocations.
1.1 Related literature
The issue of preference manipulation has been widely discussed in the literature.
Roth and Sotomayor (1990) present detailed references. Additionally, most of the
mechanisms that scholars, such as Kara and So¨nmez (1997) and Alcalde and Romero-
Medina (2000), have introduced to implement stable allocations in matching markets
do not include a capacity reporting stage.
Capacity manipulation has been studied in isolation as well. So¨nmez (1997) de-
mostrates that every stable revelation mechanism is prone to manipulation via capaci-
ties. Konishi and U¨nver (2006) present the conditions under which capacity revelation
games have pure-strategy NE , and show that under the assumption of common pref-
erences, truthful capacity reporting is a dominant strategy for colleges. Mumcu and
Saglam (2009) consider sequential capacity allocation under an assumption of com-
mon preferences. Kesten (2010) studies capacity manipulation of the intern-optimal
stable rule and the top-trading cycle rule in school admission problems. Kesten’s
(2010) result proves that if a particular acyclicity condition holds, the intern-optimal
stable matching cannot be manipulated via capacities. Finally, Ehlers (2010) relates
capacity manipulation to two forms of preference manipulation.2 To our knowledge,
the only paper that considers both capacity and preference manipulation is that of Ko-
jima and Pathak (2008), and they find that the intern-optimal stable matching leaves
little room for manipulation in large markets.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model, Section
3 studies capacity manipulation, and Section 4 extends our analysis to generalized
games of manipulation. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. The proofs are pre-
sented in the Appendix.
2 The model
There are two disjoint sets of agents, a set of interns I = (i1, ..., in) and a set of hospi-
tals H = (h1, ...,hm). Generic agents from the two sets are denoted, respectively, as i
2 See also Kojima (2007).
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and h, whereas a generic agent is denoted by x ∈H∪ I. Hospitals hire a set of interns,
and interns train in no more than one hospital. Each hospital has a capacity qh ≥ 1,
which denotes the maximum number of interns that hospital h can accept. Each in-
tern i ∈ I has a complete, transitive and strict preference ordering Pi over the set of
hospitals H ∪ {i}. Let Ri be the weak preference relation associated with Pi. Each
hospital h ∈ H has a complete, strict and transitive preference ordering Ph over the
set of interns I ∪{h}. Similarly, Rh denotes the weak preference relation associated
with Ph. Let PI = (Pi1 , ...,Pin) be the preference profile of interns over hospitals and let
PH =
(
Ph1 , ...,Phm
)
be the preference profile of hospitals over subsets of interns. The
quadruple (H, I,q,P), where P = (PH ,PI) and q = (q1, ...,qm) is a hospital-intern
market. The problem consists of matching hospitals with subsets of interns, allow-
ing for the possibility that some agents remain unmatched.
Let I′ ⊆ I be a subset of interns. The best group of interns for hospital h among
those belonging to I′ is called the choice set from I′ and is denoted by Chh(I′,Ph) or
Ch f (I′) when no ambiguity is possible. Formally, Chh(I′,Ph)= argmaxPh {I′′ : I′′ ⊆ I′}.
Let i ∈ I be an intern. If ∅Phi, hospital h prefers not to employ any intern rather than
employing i. In this case, i is unacceptable to h.3 Otherwise, i is acceptable to h.
A(h) denotes the set of interns who are individually acceptable to h. Similarly, for
every intern i ∈ I, Pi is a strict preference order defined on H ∪{i}. Any hospital h
such that iPih is unacceptable to i. Otherwise, h is acceptable to i. A(i) denotes the
set of hospitals that are acceptable to i.
We assume that the preferences of the hospitals over sets of interns are respon-
sive with respect to hospitals’ preferences over individual interns. A hospital h has
responsive preferences if, for any two assignments that differ in only one intern, it
prefers the assignment containing the most preferred intern. Formally, Ph is respon-
sive if for all I′ ⊂ I and for all interns i, i′ ∈ I: (1) I′ ∪ {i}PhI′ ∪ {i′} ⇔ iPhi′ and
(2) I′∪{i}PhI′⇔ i ∈ A(h). We say that hospitals’ preferences satisfy strong mono-
tonicity in population if every hospital h prefers a group of acceptable interns of
larger cardinality to sets of acceptable interns of smaller cardinality. Formally, if for
all h, for all J,K ⊂ A(h), |J|> |K| ⇒ JPhK. 4 A matching on (H, I,q,P) is a function
µ : H∪I→ 2I∪H such that, for every (h, i)∈H×I: (1) µ(h)∈ 2I , (2) µ(i)∈H∪{i},
(3) µ(i) = h⇔ i ∈ µ(h), and (4) |µ (h)| ≤ qh . Let Mq be the set of matchings on
(H, I,q,P). In other words, a matching is an assignment of interns to hospitals such
that no intern is hired by more than one hospital and no hospital hires more interns
than indicated by its capacity.
When there is no ambiguity, we use PH and PI to denote the following binary
relations within the set of matchings: for every µ,ν matchings, let µPHν if and only
if µ (h)Rhν (h) for all h ∈H and µ (h)Phν (h) for at least one h. Let µPIν if and only
if µ (i)Riν (i) for all i ∈ I and µ (i)Piν (i) for at least one i. Analogously, we write
µPhν and µPiν if µ (h)Phν (h) and µ (i)Piν (i), respectively.
A matching µ is individually rational if (1) µ(h) ⊆ A(h) for all h ∈ H, and
(2) µ(i) ∈ A(i) for all i ∈ I. In other words, a matching is individually rational if
each hospital is assigned acceptable interns and every intern prefers to join her as-
3 For all i, i′ ∈ I iPhi′, iPh∅ and ∅Phi denote {i}Ph {i′}, {i}Ph∅ and ∅Ph {i}, respectively.
4 The symbol |X | denotes the cardinality of the set X .
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signed hospital rather than stay unemployed. A matching µ is blocked by the pair
(h, i) ∈ H× I if (1) hPiµ(i) and (2) i ∈Chh (µ(h)∪{i}). A matching µ is stable in
(H, I,q,P) if it is individually rational and no pair blocks it. Therefore, a hospital-
intern pair (h, i) blocks a matching µ if an intern i prefers joining a hospital h over
her match or not being matched at all and hospital h prefers i to one of its interns
or prefers to leave a position vacant. Otherwise, µ is unstable. Γ (H, I,q,P) de-
notes the stable set, the set of matchings that are stable in market (H, I,q,P). If
the hospitals have responsive preferences, the stable set is not empty. There is a sta-
ble matching, which is the hospital-optimal stable matching that is (weakly) pre-
ferred to any other stable matching by every hospital. Another stable matching, the
intern-optimal stable matching, is (weakly) preferred to any other stable matching
by every intern. The hospital-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale and
Shapley, 1962) generates the hospital-optimal stable matching of (H, I,q,P), and the
intern-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm generates the intern-optimal stable
matching of (H, I,q,P). The hospital-optimal and the intern-optimal stable matchings
of (H, I,q,P) are denoted by ϕH (H, I,q,P) and ϕ I (H, I,q,P), respectively. When
there is no ambiguity, ϕH (q) and ϕ I (q) are used rather than ϕH (H, I,q,P) and
ϕ I (H, I,q,P), respectively. Finally, we denote by ϕ (q) any stable matching of market
(H, I,q,P), and we call the function ϕ a stable rule.
Let ϕ be a stable rule. In a capacity reporting game, each hospital h simultaneously
reports a capacity qh, and the outcome is determined according to ϕ . Interns are pas-
sive players, and information is complete. The capacity reporting game induced by
ϕ is a normal form game of complete information. The set of players is H, and the
strategy space of hospital h isQ (qh) = {1, ...,qh}(see also Hurwicz et al., 1995). The
outcome function is ϕ . The preferences of hospitals over outcomes are generated by
their preferences over the subsets of interns. Finally, a mechanism or rule is manip-
ulable via capacities if there is a hospital that is strictly better off by under-reporting
its capacity. Formally, the mechanism ϕ is manipulable by capacities at (q,P) if there
exists h ∈H and q′h < qh such that ϕ
(
q′h,q−h
)
Phϕ (q). Given a profile of preferences
P and a mechanism ϕ , we will say that ϕ is capacity-proof if stating the true capac-
ities is a weakly dominant strategy under ϕ (P, ·).
3 A look at Nash equilibria
In this section, we concentrate on the stability of NE outcomes of capacity report-
ing games. The objective is to provide the necessary and sufficient conditions that
guarantee the existence and the stability of pure strategy NE.
Konishi and U¨nver (2006) devote their attention to discovering sufficient condi-
tions for the existence of pure strategy NE in capacity reporting games. They also
prove that under the assumption of common preferences, stating the true capacities is
a dominant strategy for hospitals.
Our first result links the stability of NE outcomes and capacity manipulation.
Lemma 1 Let V ∈ {H, I}. Let q be a NE of the capacity revelation game induced
by ϕV at (H, I,q∗,P). If h belongs to a pair blocking ϕV (q) in (H, I,q∗,P), then
ϕV (q)PhϕV
(
q∗h,q−h
)
.
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Lemma 1 shows that if a NE produces an unstable matching, then any hospital
belonging to some blocking pair is strictly better off by manipulating its capacity. We
employ this result throughout the paper.
3.1 The hospital-optimal rule
The literature on capacity reporting games has devoted attention to the property of
strong monotonicity. Every counterexample in Konishi and U¨nver (2006) and in
So¨nmez (1997) uses preferences that are not strongly monotonic. Strong monotonic-
ity is intuitively linked to capacity manipulation. However, it is neither necessary nor
sufficient for the stability of NE outcomes, as the following example demonstrates.
Example 1 Consider the following 2× 2 problem. The preferences of the hospital
are strongly monotonic such that Ph1 : {i1, i2} ,{i1} ,{i2} and Ph2 : {i1, i2} ,{i2} ,{i1}.
The preferences of the interns are Pi1 : h2,h1 and Pi2 : h1,h2. When the capacities are
(2,2) ,(1,2) or (2,1), the unique stable matching is
µ1 =
(
h1 h2
{i2} {i1}
)
.
Where
h1
{i2} denotes that µ1(h1) = i2. When the capacities are (1,1) the matching
µ1 is the intern-optimal stable matching. The hospital-optimal stable matching is:
µ2 =
(
h1 h2
{i1} {i2}
)
.
When the capacities are (2,2) the capacity revelation game induced by ϕH has
two NE, (1,1) and (2,2). The former yields µ2 as an outcome, which is blocked by
the pair (h1, i2). The latter yields µ1 as an outcome.
When the hospitals state their true capacities, the interns receive offers from both
hospitals, along the deferred acceptance algorithm. Each intern can choose her fa-
vorite hospital, and every hospital ends up hiring its least-preferred intern. However,
both hospitals would be willing to switch their interns because there is a “cycle” in
their preferences: i1Ph1 i2Ph2 i1. This can be accomplished if both hospitals understate
their capacity. In this way, each hospital only makes an offer to its favorite intern. Ev-
ery intern accepts her unique offer and each hospital ends up hiring its favorite intern.
Notice that this possibility arises because there is also a “cycle” in the preferences of
the interns, which moves in the opposite direction of the cycle for the preferences of
the hospitals: h2Pi1h1Pi2h2.
The findings of Example 1 are intrinsic to capacity manipulation. It is the pres-
ence of simultaneous cycles of preferences that allows for the possibility of capacity
manipulation under the hospital-optimal rule.
In general, a cycle in the preferences of the hospitals arises when there is a list
of hospitals and interns alternating “on a circle” such that every hospital in the cycle
prefers the intern on its clockwise side to the intern on its counterclockwise side but
finds both acceptable. We present this concept formally in the following definitions.
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Definition 1 A hospitals’ cycle (of length T +1) is given by h0, ...,hT with hl 6= hl+1
for i = 0, ...,T and distinct i0, i1, ..., iT such that
1. i0Ph0 iT PhT iT−1...i1Ph1 i0,
2. for every l, il ∈ A(hl)∩A(hl+1).5
The preferences of the hospitals are acyclical if they have no cycles of any length.
Assume that a cycle exists. If every il is initially assigned to hl+1, every hospital
is willing to exchange its assigned intern with its successor. If the preferences are
acyclical, in particular, there are no cycles of length 2. Thus, each pair of hospitals has
the same preferences over the set of mutually acceptable interns. Therefore, the notion
of acyclicity generalizes the notion of common preferences presented by Konishi and
U¨nver (2006).
The notion of a cycle in the preferences of interns’ preferences is specular.
Definition 2 An interns’ cycle (of length T +1) is given by h0, ...,hT and i0, i1, ..., iT
such that
1. h0PiT hT PiT−1hT−1...h1Pi0h0,
2. for every l, hl ∈ A(il−1)∩A(il).
The preferences of the interns are acyclical if there are no cycles of any length.
A simultaneous cycle arises when there is a list of hospitals and interns alter-
nating “on a circle” such that every hospital (intern) prefers the intern (hospital) on
its clockwise side to the intern (hospital) on its counterclockwise side but finds both
acceptable. Formally:
Definition 3 A simultaneous cycle is given by hospitals h0, ...,hT and interns i0, i1, ..., iT
such that
1. iT PhT iT−1PhT−1iT−2 ...ioPh0 iT ,
2. h0PiT hT PiT−1hT−1...h1Pi0h0,
3. for every l, il ∈ A(hl)∩A(hl+1),
4. for every l, hl ∈ A(il−1)∩A(il).
A simultaneous cycle naturally defines two “partial-matchings” µ1 and µ2 where
µ1 (it) = ht and µ2 (it) = ht+1. Every hospital in the cycle prefers µ1, and every in-
tern in the cycle prefers µ2. The intuition developed in Example 1 helps to state the
following lemma.
Lemma 2 Let V ∈ {H, I}. If ϕV (q)PhϕV
(
q∗h,q−h
)
for some h and some qh < q∗h,
then there exists a simultaneous cycle.
From Lemmas 1 and 2, it follows that if no simultaneous cycle exists, stating
the true capacities is a dominant strategy for hospitals in both the hospital-optimal
and the intern-optimal stable matchings. From Proposition 1 in Romero-Medina and
Triossi (2011), it follows that this result extends to any stable rule.
5 From now on, indices are considered modulo T +1.
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Proposition 1 Assume that no simultaneous cycle exists and let ϕ be any stable rule.
Then,
(1) ϕ is capacity-proof.
(2) For each q, the capacity revelation games induced by ϕ have a unique NE,
that is, the unique stable matching of (H, I,q,P).
Notice that requiring a profile of preferences not to have simultaneous cycles is
much less demanding than requiring acyclicity in the preferences of the hospitals or
of the interns. Assume for instance that hospital h prefers intern ik to intern il and
hospital h′ prefers intern il to intern ik. Assume that ik and il are acceptable to both
hi and h j. We have a cycle of length 2. However, if ik and il rank h and h′ in the
same way we do not have a simultaneous cycle. More precisely, let Hkl be the set
of hospitals that prefer intern ik to intern il and find both acceptable. If there are
no simultaneous cycles, then the preferences of ik and il must coincide on all pairs of
hospitals (h,h′)∈Hkl×Hlk. In particular, the result holds when either the preferences
of the hospitals or the preferences of the interns are acyclical, and thereby generalizes
Theorems 6 and 7 in Konishi and U¨nver (2006). Actually, acyclicity is the weakest
condition that guarantees that stating the true capacities is a dominant strategy and
that every NE yields a stable matching under the hospital-optimal stable rule.
Proposition 2 Assume that the preferences of the hospitals (interns) have a cycle.
Then, there exists a preference profile for the interns (hospitals) and a vector of ca-
pacities q such that the capacity reporting game induced by ϕH yields an unstable
matching at equilibrium at (H, I,q,P).
Thus, from Propositions 1 and 2 and Lemma 1 follows the following equivalence
result.
Corollary 1 Let PH and I be given. Then, ϕ (P, ·) is capacity-proof for any PI if and
only if PH does not contain any cycle.
It follows that the hospital-optimal stable matching is manipulable via capacities
under relatively weak conditions. Indeed, assume that all interns (hospital) are ac-
ceptable to every hospital (intern). In this case, assuming acyclicity is equivalent to
the assumption that all hospitals (interns) have the same preferences for individual
interns (for hospitals) (see Triossi and Romero Medina, 2011).
3.2 The intern-optimal rule
The intern-optimal stable matching makes stating their true preferences a dominant
strategy for interns. Furthermore, Kojima and Pathak (2008) find that the intern-
optimal stable matching leaves little room for manipulation in large markets. Ac-
cording to Pathak and So¨nmez (2009) the intern-optimal stable matching is strongly
more manipulable via colleges preferences than the hospital-optimal stable match-
ing. Nevertheless, several matching procedures have been redesigned to use intern-
optimal stable matching. Examples of this include the NRMP and the school alloca-
tion method currently used in Boston.
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In the case of manipulation via capacities, the evidence is inconclusive. Roth and
Peranson (1999) observed little evidence of differential manipulability via capacities
between the initial NRMP and the intern-optimal version of the same algorithm. We
find that the game induced by the intern-optimal stable matching is more resistant to
capacity manipulation.
First, to include capacity manipulation in the intern-optimal stable matching, at
least three interns are needed. Consider, for instance, a matching market with only
two interns and assume that at least one hospital has a capacity of two. If the two
interns are assigned to one hospital, this hospital cannot benefit from rejecting one
of them because the preferences are responsive. If the interns are assigned to two
different hospitals, reducing capacities does not affect the outcome of the game.
There is a second and more important difference between the manipulability of
the hospital-optimal and intern-optimal stable matchings. Under the hospital-optimal
rule, a hospital that understates capacities refrains from granting admission to some
interns in the deferred acceptance algorithm. In this way, it prevents potential cycles
of rejections of hospitals by interns. Under intern-optimal stable matching, the situa-
tion is different. By understating capacities a hospital generates a chain of rejections
of interns by hospitals. Therefore, such a hospital might receive more applications
from interns, but it will be able to fill fewer positions. As we will later prove, a hos-
pital under the intern-optimal rule needs non-monotonic preferences to profit from
capacity manipulation. Notice that if there are only two interns, the capacity revela-
tion game induced by ϕ I yields the intern-optimal stable matching as a NE outcome,
in contrast to the case of ϕH . Example 2 provides the basic intuition that explains
how the intern-optimal stable rule can result in unstable matchings.
Example 2 Let I = {i1, i2, i3, i4} ,H = {h1,h2}. Let Ph1 be such that Ph1 :{i1, i2, i3} ,{i1, i2} ,
{i1, i3} ,{i1},{i2, i3} ,{i2},{i3},{i4}, and let Ph2 be strongly monotonic in population
according to the following preference over individual interns Ph2 :{i4},{i3},{i2},{i1}.
Let Pi1 : h2,h1, Pi2 : h1,h2, Pi3 : h1,h2, and Pi4 :h2,h1 . When the capacity is (2,2), the
intern-optimal stable matching is
µ1 =
(
h1 h2
{i2, i3} {i1, i4}
)
.
When the capacity is (1,2), the intern-optimal stable matching is
µ2 =
(
h1 h2 /0
{i1} {i3, i4} {i2}
)
.
When the capacity is (2,2), the unique NE under the intern-optimal rule is (1,2),
which yields an unstable matching, µ2.
In Example 2, if h1 states its true capacity, it only receives applications from i2
and i3 and it never receives an application from i1 under the intern-optimal deferred
acceptance algorithm. If h1 understates its capacity, it rejects the application from
i3 in the first stage of the deferred acceptance algorithm. In the second stage of the
deferred acceptance algorithm, i3 applies to h2 and induces the rejection of i1 by h2.
Finally, h1 receives an application from i1 and rejects i2. The non-monotonicity of
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h1’s preferences is necessary to generate the instability. The cycle at h1 makes the
chain of rejections possible.
Assume that hospital h has capacity qh and fills the qthh position at stage k of the
deferred acceptance algorithm for the first time. Let Ih be the set of interns employed
at h at stage k−1. Stating capacity qh−1 can be profitable to h only if some intern i
filling the qthh position applies to hospital h
′ and induces a chain of rejections such that
some interns must apply to and be accepted by h. In this situation, h ends up with a
new set of interns I′h with at most qh−1 interns. If capacity manipulation is profitable,
then I′hPh(Ih∪{i}). Therefore, the preferences of h must not be strictly monotonic, as
|Ih∪{i}|>
∣∣I′h∣∣.
To describe the appropriate chains of rejections, we show that a new notion of
cycles is necessary.
Definition 4 A generalized cycle (of length T + 1) at h is given by a cycle in hos-
pital’s preferences h = h0, ...,hT , i0, i1, ..., iT and by i−1 such that: i0Ph0 i−1Ph0 iT .
Notice that in Example 2, there is a generalized cycle at h1: i1Ph1 {i2, i3}, i1Ph1 i3Ph2
i2Ph2 i1. If every hospital finds all interns to be acceptable, any generalized cycle can
be reduced to a generalized cycle of length 2 (see Ergin, 2002). Assume that a gen-
eralized cycle of length 2 at h exists. Let h0 be matched with two interns i−1 and
i1. and let h1 be matched with i0. Assume also that i0Ph0 {i−1, i1}. Hospital h0 would
be willing to exchange its two interns for i0 only, and h1 would accept the proposal
(potentially only hiring i1). In general, non-monotonicity in the preferences of the
hospitals and the generalized cycles must be connected in a particular way for capac-
ity manipulation to be profitable under the intern-optimal rule.
Definition 5 A non-monotonic cycle at h is given by M,M′ ⊆ I, with |M| < |M′|
such that
(1) MPhM′.
(2) Let M \M′ = {i1, ..., is}. For k = 1, ...,s there is a generalized cycle at h,
hk0, ...,h
k
T k , i
k
−1, i
k
0, i
k
1, ..., i
k
T k , T
k ≥ 1 such that ik = ik0 and ik−1, ikT k ∈M′ \M.
(3) For k 6= k′, ikl 6= ik
′
l′ for all l = 0, ...T
k, l′ = 0, ...,T k′ .
The definition of a non-monotonic cycle is simple but demanding. It links non-
monotonicity with cycles of rejection. It requires that (1) h prefers some set of interns
containing fewer elements, M, to a set of interns containing more elements, M′, and
(2) any intern who belongs to the set with more interns but not to the one with fewer
interns must be the starting point of a generalized cycle at h, for which the last intern
of the cycle and ik−1 belong to the larger set (M
′) but not to the smaller set (M); and
(3) all the cycles in (2) must be disconnected.
The main result of this section weakens the requirements of Proposition 1: the
intern-optimal stable matching is non-manipulable via capacities under relatively
weak conditions.
Proposition 3 Assume that no non-monotonic cycle exists. Then,
(1) ϕ I is capacity-proof, and
(2) for each q, the capacity revelation game induced by ϕ I yields the intern-optimal
stable matching of (H, I,q,P) at every NE.
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If the preferences of the hospitals satisfy strong monotonicity in population (see def-
inition in Section 2), no non-monotonic cycle exists and Proposition 3 implies and
extends Theorem 5 in Konishi and U¨nver (2006), as we formally state in the follow-
ing Corollary.
Corollary 2 Assume that one of the following conditions holds: the preferences of
the hospitals satisfy strong monotonicity in population, there is no cycle of a length
larger than 2 in the preferences of the hospitals, and there are no generalized cycles.
Then, ϕ I is capacity-proof and the game yields the intern-optimal stable matching at
every NE.
The absence of non-monotonic cycles is the minimal condition required to pre-
vent capacity manipulation. If a non-monotonic cycle exists, there is a preference
profile for the interns and a vector of capacities q such that the capacity reporting
game yields an unstable matching in equilibrium. Additionally, if the preferences of
the interns have a cycle of length at least 3, there exists a preference profile for the
hospitals and a vector of capacities q such that the capacity reporting game yields
an unstable matching in equilibrium. The same applies to the preferences profile for
those interns with cycles of lengths less than 3. The following proposition shows
which hospitals might benefit from capacity manipulation.
Proposition 4 Assume that there exists a non-monotonic cycle at h or that the pref-
erences of the interns have a cycle length at least 3. Then,
(1) there is a preferences profile for the interns and a vector of capacities q such that
the capacity reporting game induced by ϕ I yields an unstable matching at equilib-
rium, and
(2) there is a preferences profile for the interns and a vector of capacities q such that
hospital h can manipulate ϕ I at (q,P).
Notice that Theorem 1 in Kesten (2010) shows that given a vector of capacity
and preference (q,P), the intern-optimal stable matching cannot be manipulated via
capacities if and only if (q,P) has no cycles. In Kesten (2010) (see also Ergin, 2002),
a priority structure contains a cycle if the following two conditions are satisfied: (1)
There is a generalized cycle of length 2, h0,h1, i0, i1, i−1. (2) There exist disjoint sets
of interns Nh0 , Nh1such that iPh0 i−1 for all i∈Nh0 , iPh1 i0 for all i∈Nh1 ,
∣∣Nh0 ∣∣= qh0−1
and
∣∣Nh1 ∣∣= qh1−1. This definition of a cycle imposes a restriction on capacities that
is absent in ours. Furthermore, given a cycle of length 2, there always exists a capacity
vector such that condition (2) is satisfied with Nh0 = Nh1 = /0 and qh0 = qh1 = 1.
Finally, our condition for a non-monotonic cycle in Definition 5 is more restrictive.
It requires the existence of non-monotonic preferences and, at least, a generalized
cycle.6
4 Generalized games of manipulation
In most real life mechanisms, the strategic possibilities of agents go beyond capac-
ity manipulation. For example, after hospitals have revealed their capacities, interns
6 The example that proves the sufficiency of Kesten’s condition for capacity manipulation includes a
non-monotonic cycle.
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are assigned to hospitals according to stated preferences (for instance, in the NRMP,
the Boston and New York mechanisms). The game that follows the capacity reve-
lation stage has been modeled in different ways in the literature (see Alcalde and
Romero-Medina, 2000; Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2005 and Sotomayor, 2008). At this
stage, both hospitals and interns can manipulate the outcome by misrepresenting their
preferences. We now define a class of games that allows for the manipulation of both
capacities and preferences.
Definition 6 Let (H, I,q,P) be a hospital-intern market. A generalized game of ma-
nipulation is
{
Gq′
}
q′≤q where Gq′ =
(
H, I,Mq′ ,gq′
)
is a game form. The set of play-
ers is H ∪ I, the strategy space is Mq′ = ∏i∈I Mq′,i×∏h∈H Mq′,h, and the outcome
function is gq′ : Mq′ →Mq′ .
For every q′ ≤ q, Gq′ describes the game played by the agents following the rev-
elation of a vector of capacities q′.
In the remainder of this section, we consider games in which hospitals simultane-
ously reveal a capacity q in the first stage and agents play the game Gq =(H, I,Mq,gq)
in the second stage. We explore both revelation and non-revelation GGM.
4.1 Revelation games
We assume that the game played after the capacity revelation stage is a revelation
game induced by a stable rule ϕ . Formally, Mq,x =Px for all x ∈ H ∪ I, gq (m) ∈
Γ (H, I,q,P) for all q. Such a generalized game of manipulation will be called preference-
capacity manipulation game.
It is well known that no stable capacity revelation game makes the revelation of
both every agent’s preferences and capacities a dominant strategy. Therefore, the con-
cept of a dominant strategy is too demanding for this framework. However, when the
intern-optimal stable matching is used, stating true preferences is always a dominant
strategy for interns. From Proposition 3, we also know that if the interns strategy PI
is a vector of acyclic preferences,7 then stating true capacities is a dominant strategy
for hospitals. In addition, the following result holds.
Proposition 5 Assume that the preferences of the interns are acyclical. When the
intern-optimal stable rule is used, the unique outcome that survives the iterated elim-
ination of weakly dominated strategies in the preference-capacity manipulation game
is the intern-optimal stable matching.
An analogous result does not hold when the hospital-optimal stable rule is em-
ployed because truth-telling is not a dominant strategy for any agent.
However, there are situations in which the preferences of the hospitals can be
taken as given. This situation is due, for instance, to institutional constraints. In this
case, we can consider Mq,h = {Ph} for all h ∈H, Mq,i =Pi for all i ∈ I, and gq (m) ∈
Γ (H, I,q,P) for all q. Sotomayor (2008) shows that, when capacities are known, the
game induced by the hospital-optimal rule implements the stable set in NE. However,
7 Notice that acyclicity implies non-monotonic cycles
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this is not enough to prevent capacity manipulation. Only the assumption of acyclicity
prevents the implementation of unstable allocations.
Proposition 6 Let V ∈ {H, I} and let gq (m) = ϕV (P,q) for all q. If the preferences
of either interns or hospitals have no simultaneous cycles, the preference-capacity
manipulation games induced by ϕV yield the unique stable matching of (H, I,q,P) as
a SPE outcome.
Proposition 6 follows from Sotomayor (2008) and Proposition 1.
4.2 Non-revelation games
In this section we consider capacity manipulation in non-revelation games, that are
games where the strategy space of each agent does not necessarily coincide with her
type space. Kara and So¨nmez (1997) prove that the stable set is implementable in
NE through a non-revelation game. Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2000), Sotomayor
(2003), and Romero-Medina and Triossi (2010) present extensive form games capa-
ble of implementing the stable set and the intern-optimal stable matching in SPE.
For the remainder of the section, we assume that every Gq′ is an extensive form
game. Let SPE
(
Gq′ ,q′,P
)
be the set of SPE outcomes of Gq′ when the capacity-
preference vector is (q′,P). We assume that SPE
(
Gq′ ,q′,P
) 6= /0 for all q′ and that
all such SPE outcomes are stable with respect to the stated capacities, which are
/0$ SPE
(
Gq′ ,q′,P
)⊆ Γ (H, I,q′,P) for all q′.8 We call the family {Gq′}q′ , stable.
Even if the family
{
Gq′
}
q′ is well behaved, adding a capacity manipulation stage
does not guarantee that the resulting GGM produces stable matching in every SPE.
In fact, the negative result is even stronger.
Proposition 7 Assume that there are at least two hospitals and three interns. There
is no family of stable non-revelation mechanisms
{
Gq′
}
q′ such that the associated
generalized game of manipulation yields stable SPE for all q.
Proof The proof is by means of an example, based on So¨nmez (1997).
Let H ⊇{h1,h2} and let I⊇{i1, i2, i3}. Let Ph1 : {i1, i2, i3},{i1, i2},{i1, i3},{i1},{i2, i3},{i2},{i3},
and let Ph2 : {i1, i2, i3},{i2, i3},{i1, i3},{i3},{i1, i2},{i2},{i1}. Let Pi1 = h2,h1, Pi2 =
h1,h2, and Pi3 = h1,h2. Finally, let q1 = q2 = 2, q
′
1 = q
′
2 = 1 be the possible capaci-
ties.
Assume that qhl = 1 for all l ≥ 3. Let PH be such that i j, j = 1,2,3 is not acceptable
to hl , l > 2 such that i j, j > 3 is not acceptable to h1 or to h2 and such that each i j,
j > 3 is acceptable to at most one hospital. Let µ be the unique stable matching of
the market
(
H \{h1,h2} , I \{i1, i2, i3},qH\{h1,h2},PH\{h1,h2},PI\{i1,i2,i3}
)
.
Let µ0 =
(
h1 h2 /0
{i1} {i3} {i2}
)
, µ1 =
(
h1 h2
{i2} {i1,i3}
)
, µ2 =
(
h1 h2
{i1} {i2,i3}
)
,
µ3 =
(
h1 h2
{i1, i2} {i3}
)
, and µ4 =
(
h1 h2
{i2, i3} {i1}
)
. Then:
8 While restrictive, this condition is nonetheless necessary for the GGM to yield stable allocations.
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Γ (1,1,qH\{h1,h2}) = {
(
µ0,µ
)}, Γ (1,2,qH\{h1,h2}) = {(µ1,µ) ,(µ2,µ)},
Γ (2,1,qH\{h1,h2}) = {
(
µ3,µ
)
,
(
µ4,µ
)}, Γ (2,2,qH\{h1,h2}) = {(µ4,µ)}.
We prove that for every family
{
Gq′
}
q′ of stable mechanisms, the generalized
game of manipulation induced by
{
Gq′
}
q′ yields an unstable matching at some SPE
when the true capacity vector is (2,2,qH\{h1,h2}).
Assume by contradiction that there is a family
{
Gq′
}
q′ of stable mechanisms such
that the generalized game of manipulation induced by
{
Gq′
}
q′ yields a selection of
the stable set in SPE for every q. When both capacities are equal to 2 the SPE out-
come is
(
µ4,µ
)
. There are two possibilities: either the SPE yielding
(
µ4,µ
)
includes
hospitals’ h1 and h2 true capacities or it does not.
From subgame perfection, it follows that when both hospitals have capacity 2,(
µ4,µ
)
must be the unique NE outcome of one of the following games or no such
games can have a pure strategy NE (without loss of generality, we disregard the
moves of hospitals hl , for l ≥ 3:
(1)
h1\h2 1 2
1 i1, i3 i2,{i1,i3}
2 {i2, i3}, i1 {i2, i3}, i1
, (2)
h1\h2 1 2
1 i1, i3 i1,{i2, i3}
2 {i2, i3}, i1 {i2, i3}, i1
,
(3)
h1\h2 1 2
1 i1, i3 i2,{i1,i3}
2 {i1, i2}, i3 {i2, i3}, i1
, (4)
h1\h2 1 2
1 i1, i3 i2,{i1,i3}
2 {i1, i2}, i3 {i2, i3}, i1
,
where the table above presents the outcomes at matching µ4 as a result of the
capacities declared by h1 and h2. For example, µ4(h1 | (qh1 ,qh2) = (1,1)) = i1 ,
µ4(h2 | (qh1 ,qh2) = (1,2)) = {i1,i3} and so on. Games (1) and (2) have (1,2) as
NE. Games (3) and (4) have (2,1) as NE. None of the NE yields µ4, thus yielding a
contradiction.
However, if there are no simultaneous cycles, then any such mechanisms imple-
ment the stable allocations.
Proposition 8 Assume that the family of non-revelation mechanisms
{
Gq
}
q′≤q is sta-
ble. Assume that the preferences of the agents P have no simultaneous cycles. Then
every SPE of the generalized game of capacity manipulation induced by
{
Gq
}
q′≤q
yields the unique stable matching of (H, I,q,P).
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we study the interaction between preference and capacity manipula-
tion in many-to-one matching markets. This interaction, which has been largely over-
looked in the literature, is relevant in determining the likelihood of finding stable
allocations in these markets. We first provide the necessary and sufficient conditions
that guarantee the stability of NE and the strategy-proofness of truthful capacity rev-
elation under the hospital-optimal and the intern-optimal stable rules. It turns out
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that the hospital-optimal rule is more prone to capacity manipulation than the intern-
optimal rule. This result is in line with that of Kojima and Pathak (2008), who show
how the intern-optimal rule leaves little room for manipulation in large markets. Sec-
ond, we study generalized games of manipulation. A GGM is a multi-stage game in
which hospitals first state their capacities and then interns are assigned to hospitals
using a sequential mechanism. In the GGM, the agents develop the full extent of their
strategic capabilities in a setting in which both capacity and preference manipulation
are allowed. In this setting, we first present an impossibility result: none of the games
can implement stable allocations in a general domain. However, if we restrict the
preference domain, implementation becomes feasible. We show that the absence of
simultaneous cycles guarantees the stability of NE outcomes when the preferences of
hospitals are known, i.e., in a stable revelation mechanism. Furthermore, in the case
of stable non-revelation mechanisms, we find that there is no possibility of imple-
menting stable matching, unless preferences are acyclical.
The previous results in GGM provide insight as to the reasons why capacity
manipulation may hinder the implementability of stable matching in some markets.
First, the choice of the rule to be implemented is determinant because the hospital-
optimal rule favors capacity manipulation. Moreover, the consequences of the previ-
ous choice differ depending on whether the GGM is designed with a revelation or a
non-revelation mechanism.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Let q be a NE when the capacity vector is q∗ and let µ = ϕV (q)
be the matching outcome. Assume µ is unstable in (H, I,q∗,P). Let (h, j) ∈H× I be
a hospital-intern pair blocking µ and set µ∗ = ϕV
(
q∗h,q−h
)
.
We next prove that µPhµ∗. We already know that µ (h)Rhµ∗ (h) because q is a
NE. First, notice that qh < q∗h and |µ (h)| = qh, otherwise (h, j) would block µ in
(H, I,q,P). Consider the related one-to-one matching market. Let h′c denote a copy
of hospital h′ ∈H in that market. From Proposition 2 in Gale and Sotomayor (1985a)
it follows that µ∗RIµ and µRh′cµ
∗ for every h′ 6= h and µRhcµ∗ for every hc such
that µ (hc) 6= hc. Furthermore, µRhµ∗ because q is a NE and µ 6= µ∗ because µ is
unstable in
(
H, I,
(
q∗h,q−h
)
,P
)
. Thus, µPHµ∗ and µ∗PIµ . Finally, µPhµ∗, otherwise
(h, j) would block µ in (H, I,q,P). 
Proof of Lemma 2: Let q be a vector of capacities. Let h ∈ H. Let qh < q∗h and let
q−h be the vector of capacities for the other hospitals. Set µ = ϕV (q) and set µ∗ =
ϕV
(
q∗h,q−h
)
. We prove that if µPhµ∗, then a simultaneous cycle exists. Proposition 2
in Gale and Sotomayor (1985a) (applied to the related one-to-one matching market)
implies that µ∗PIµ and µPHµ∗. More precisely, it implies that iPh′ j for all h′ such
that µ (h′) 6= µ∗ (h′), for all i ∈ µ (h′)\µ∗ (h′) and for all j ∈ µ∗ (h′)\µ (h′). Set I′ =
{i : µ∗Piµ} 6= /0. Let h0 ∈ µ (I′), then µPh0µ∗ and set i0 = maxPh0 µ (h0)\µ∗ (h0), i0 ∈
I′. For all l ≥ 1, set hl+1 = µ∗ (il) if hl+1 6= ht for every t < l+1 and set hl+1 = hl oth-
erwise. Observe that h0 6= h1. Let il = maxPhl−1 µ (hl−1)\ (µ
∗ (hl−1)∪{i0, ..., il−1}) if
16 Antonio Romero-Medina, Matteo Triossi
µ∗ (hl−1)∪{i1, ..., il−1}+ µ (hl−1), and set il+1 = il otherwise. The sequence is sta-
tionary because I′ is finite. Let l¯ be the minimal number l ≥ 1 such that hl = hl+1. Let
k be such that hk = hl . Set jl = il+k and rl = hl+k for every l ≤ l− k. The sequence
satisfies µ ( jl) = hl = µ∗ ( jl−1) for 1 ≤ l ≤ l− k− 1, and µ∗
(
jl¯−k
)
= r0 = µ ( j0).
We have: (1) jlPrl jl+1 for all 1≤ l ≤ l− k and j0Pr0 jl¯−k; (2) rl+1Pjl rl for all 0≤ l ≤
l− k−1 and r0Pjl¯−k jl¯−k. Thus, h0, ...,hk,r0, ...,rk constitute a simultaneous cycle. 
Proof of Proposition 1: (1) From Lemma 2, ϕH cannot be manipulated through
capacities. From Proposition 1 in Romero-Medina and Triossi (2011) it follows that
if P has no simultaneous cycles, the set of stable matchings is a singleton for every q,
then ϕH (P,q) = ϕ (P,q) for every stable rule ϕ , for every q. It follows that no stable
rule ϕ can be manipulates through capacities.
(2) From (1) a NE yielding a stable matching exists. From Lemma 1 and (1) the game
does not yield unstable matchings at equilibrium. The rest of the claim follows from
Proposition 1 in Romero-Medina and Triossi (2011), which shows that if there are no
simultaneous cycles the set of stable matchings is a singleton. 
Proof of Proposition 2: Assume that there is a hospitals’ cycle. Let h0, ...,hT and
i0, i1, ..., iT be defined as in Definition 1. We define a preference profile for the interns
as follows. Let hl+1Pil hl and A(il) = {hl ,hl+1} for l = 0, ...,T . Let PI\{i0,...,iT } be any
vector of preferences. Consider the market
(
H \{h0, ...,hT} , I \{i0, ..., iT} ,q−{h0,...,hT },
PH\{h0,...,hT },PI′\{i0,...,iT }
)
and let µ ′ be the hospital-optimal stable matching. Let
PI\{i0,...,iT } such that A(i) = µ(i) for every i ∈ I. When qhl = 2 for l = 0, ...,T ,
the market (H, I,q,P) has a unique stable matching: µ (i) = µ ′ (i) for every i ∈
I′ \ {i0, ..., iT} and µ (il) = hl+1, for l = 0, ...,T . It is easy to see that when q =(
2, ...,2,q−{h0,...,hT }
)
, the message
(
1, ...,1,q−{h0,...,hT }
)
is a NE. The matching out-
come is µ∗, where µ∗ (i) = µ ′ (i) for every i ∈ I′ \{i0, ..., iT} i 6= i1, i2, µ∗ (il) = hl+1,
for l = 0, ...,T . The matching µ∗ is blocked by (h2, i1).
The proof of the remainder of the claim is identical and thus omitted. 
Proof of Proposition 3: Claim (1). Let h ∈H. Let qh < q∗h and let q−h be a vector of
capacities for hospitals other than h. Set µ = ϕ I (q) and µ∗ = ϕ I
(
q∗h,q−h
)
. We prove
that if µPhµ∗, a non-monotonic cycle exists. Proposition 2 in Gale and Sotomayor
(1985b), applied to the related one-to-one market, implies that for every h′ ∈ H and
i, j ∈ I such that i ∈ µ (h′)\µ∗ (h′), j ∈ µ∗ (h′)\µ (h′) we have iPh′ j. From µPhµ∗ it
follows that µPHµ∗. Proposition 2 in Gale and Sotomayor (1985b) also implies that
µ∗P∗I µ .
There is no loss of generality in assuming that µ∗ (i) is i’s favorite hospital, for ev-
ery i ∈ I, because µPHµ∗ and µ∗PIµ . Consider the deferred acceptance algorithm
where interns apply and the capacity vector is q. Let i be the first intern rejected by
µ∗ (i) = h′. When i is rejected, hospital h′ has all its qh′ positions filled; hence i is
rejected in favor of an intern in µ∗ (h′). It follows that |µ (h′)|< |µ∗ (h′)| and h = h′,
thus the preferences of h are not monotonic.
Set M = µ (h) and M′ =µ∗ (h). Let M \M′ = {i1, ..., is} and M′ \M = { j1, ..., jq} .
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Set r = |M′|− |M| . It has been assumed that µ∗ (i) is i’s favorite hospital. Remember
that MPhM′ . Consider the deferred acceptance algorithm where interns apply to hos-
pitals and the capacity vector is q, which leads to µ . For every i ∈ I, intern i applies
to µ∗ (i) in the first stage of the deferred acceptance algorithm leading to µ . It must
be the case that exactly r interns are rejected by h in the first stage of the deferred
acceptance algorithm.
The remainder of the proof of Claim (1) is divided into two parts, where we find the
elements of the non-monotonic cycles at h that appear in Definition 5, separately
(a) First, we find it−1, as in Definition 5, using the following algorithm.
Step 1. Consider i1. Let d0 > 1 be the stage of the deferred acceptance algorithm lead-
ing to µ where i1 has been accepted by h, and let w1 ∈ I be an intern that has been
rejected by h in favor of i1. If w1 ∈M′, stop and set i1−1 = w1, otherwise at step d1,
1 < d1 < d0, w1 has been accepted and an intern w2 has been rejected in favor of w1.
For all k≥ 2, if wk ∈M′, stop and set i1−1 = wk, otherwise at step dk, 1< dk < dk−1, wk
has been accepted by h and an intern wk+1 has been rejected by h in favor of wk. The
sequence eventually stops at a wK1 ∈M′ who has been rejected by h in a step dK1 > 1
of the deferred acceptance algorithm.9 Set i1−1 = wK1 and W
1 = {w1, ...,wK1}. Notice
that i1−1 belongs to M
′ \M. There is no loss of generality in assuming that i1−1 = j1.
We have i1Ph j1.
Step t. 2≤ t ≤ s. Let d0 > 1 be the stage of the deferred acceptance algorithm leading
to µ where it has been accepted by h and let w1 ∈ I \⋃t−1l=1 W l be an intern that has
been rejected by h in favor of it . This is possible because if a number of interns are ac-
cepted by a college h¯ at the same stage t > 1 of the deferred acceptance algorithm, the
same number of interns who were previously employed at h¯ are rejected. If w1 ∈M′,
stop and set it−1 = w1, otherwise at step d1, 1 < d1 < d0, w1 has been accepted and
an intern w2 ∈ I \⋃t−1l=1 W l has been rejected in favor of w1. For all k ≥ 2, if wk ∈M′,
stop and set it−1 = wk, otherwise at step dk, 1 < dk < dk−1, wk has been accepted by
h and an intern wk+1 has been rejected by h in favor of wk. The sequence eventually
stops at some wKt ∈M′ who has been rejected by h in a step dKt > 1 of the deferred
acceptance algorithm.10 Set it−1 = wKt and set W
t = {w1, ...,wKt}. Notice that it−1
belongs to M′ \M. There is no loss of generality in assuming that it−1 = jt . We have
itPh jt .
By construction it−1 6= il−1 for l 6= t.
(b) Next, for every k = 1, ...,s we find the hk0, ...,h
k
T k , i
k
0, i
k
1, ..., i
k
T k from Definition 5
and conclude.
For k = 1, ...,s set ik0 = i
k.
Step 1.k. Let ik1 be the intern in favor of which i
k
0 has been rejected by µ
∗ (ik0)= hk1.
Step t.k, t ≥ 2. At a stage dt of the deferred acceptance algorithm leading to µ ,
ikt has been rejected by h
k
p+1 = µ
∗ (ikt ) 6= hkt in favor of an intern ikt+1 /∈ µ∗ (hkt ).
If hkt = h
k′
l and d
k
t = d
k′
l for some k
′ < k and for some l, hkt has received at least∣∣∣{k′ < k : hkt = hk′l for some l and dkt = dk′l }∣∣∣+ 1 applications that are better than ikt .
Hence we can choose a ikt that is different from every other i
k′
l , 0 ≤ k′ < k. We
9 Every intern in the sequence is rejected because of the arrival of an application from another intern.
10 See footnote 9.
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have hkt+1 = µ
∗ (ikt ) for all k, ikt Phkt+1 ikt+1 and hkt+1Pikt hkt .11 The sequence stops at a
T k where hkT k = h rejects some interns in the first stage of the algorithm. By (a),
ik0Phi
k
−1Phi
k
T k . Therefore, there is a hospital h ∈ H and M,M′ subsets of interns, that
satisfy |M| < |M′|, MPhM′ and generalized cycles hk0, ...,hkT k , ik−1, ik0, ik1, ..., ikT k with
T k ≥ 1 such that h = hk0 and ik = ik0 where ik−1, ikT k ∈M′ \M and ik−1 6= ik
′
−1, for k 6= k′.
Therefore, there is a non-monotonic cycle at h.
Claim (2). By Claim (1) there exists a NE that yields a stable matching. By Lemma 1
there are no unstable equilibria; hence every equilibrium outcome is stable. By con-
tradiction, assume that the outcome is not the intern-optimal stable matching. It must
be the case that some hospital has misrepresented its true capacity. Let q be a NE of
the game and q∗ ≥ q be the true capacity vector. Set µ = ϕ I (q) and µ∗ = ϕ I (q∗).
From Claim (1) µ is stable in (H, I,q∗,P), so µPHµ∗ and µ∗PIµ . There is no loss of
generality in assuming that µ∗ (i) is intern i’s favorite hospital. The matching µ is ob-
tained through the intern-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm. It must be the case
that at least one i is rejected by µ∗ (i) = h in the first stage of the deferred acceptance
algorithm. Every intern applies to her hospital under µ∗ at this stage because h has
misrepresented its true capacity. Hence h has fewer interns under µ than under µ∗.
This yields a contradiction because both matchings are stable in (H, I,q∗,P). 
Proof of Proposition 4: Assume that there is a non-monotonic cycle at h. Using the
notation from Definition 5, let I′ =
{
i1T k : h
k
l = h
}
∩M′ ∪ {i1−1, ..., is−1}. Set M∗ =
M′ ∩M ∪ I′. Notice that |M′| > |M| and MPhM′. Set the preferences of the interns
as follows. Let A
(
ikl
)
=
{
hkl ,h
k
l+1
}
and hkl+1Phk h
k
l for all k and all l. Let A(i) =
{h} if i ∈ M′ ∩M. For all other interns, let A(i) = {h(i)} for a hospital h(i) /∈{
hkl : k = 1, ...,s; l = 1, ...,T
k
}
. Let qh0 = qh =
∣∣M*∣∣ and q = 1 for all k, l such that
hkl 6= h. Set all other capacities arbitrarily. We have ϕ I (q) = M∗. From the property
of the non-monotonic cycle at h, we know that ϕ I
(
q′h,q−h
)
RhMPhM∗. Let q′h be h’s
best response to q−h. We have q′h < qh. It is easy to see that
(
q′h,q−h
)
is a NE at
(H, I,q,P). It yields a matching that is unstable because in any stable matching of
(H, I,q,P) h is matched to |M∗|> q′h interns. 
Proof of Proposition 5: When the intern-optimal rule is used the revelation of true
preferences is a dominant strategy for interns. From Proposition 3 we have
ϕ I (qh,q−h,P)Rhϕ I
(
q′h,q−h,P
)
for all q′h,qh such that q
′
h ≤ qh and for all h. Thus, to
complete the proof of the claim it suffices to show that ϕ I (q,PH ,PI)Rh
ϕ I
(
q,P′h,P−h,PI
)
for all q, and P′h as well as for all h if the preferences of the interns
are acyclical. But this follows from Lemma 3 in Romero-Medina and Triossi (2011).

Proof of Proposition 6: The claim follows from Theorem 1 on Sotomayor (2008)
(pp. 631-632) and Proposition 1. 
11 Because ikp first applies to h
k
p+1in the deferred acceptance algorithm.
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Proof of Proposition 8: The claim follows from Proposition 1. 
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